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Reginald Ivie was sentenced on a Lewd Conduct conviction, LC. §18-1508, on February 11, 
2016, the Honorable John Mitchell presiding. He received a sentence of seven years determinate 
followed by an indeterminate term of life in the penitentiary. Mr. Ivie appeals this sentence as 
excessive in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the case. 
Il. ISSUES ASSERTED 
Was Mr. Ivie's Sentence Excessive in light ofivie' slack of prior record and the Information 
Provided to the Court at Sentencing? 
III. BACKGROUND FACTS 
Reginald Ivie was charged with one count of Lewd Conduct with a minor, I. C. § 18-1509, on 
or around July 2, 2015. The incidents were alleged to have occurred on or around March 4, 2015. 
Mr. Ivie pleaded guilty on December 17, 2016. On February 11, 2016, Reginald Ivie was sentenced 
by Honorable John T. Mitchell to a determinate term of seven years in prison and an indeterminate 
term not to exceed life in prison. At the time of the incident alleged, the victim was thirteen (13) 
years old. Mr. Ivie admitted to having inappropriate sexual relations with the victim on only one 
occasion. (R.P.3). Mr. Ivie was not charged with, nor did he plead guilty to, rape of a minor child. 
Mr. Ivie had no prior felony convictions at the time of his sentencing in this or any other State. 
(R.P .4). His entire record consisted of one prior misdemeanor conviction of battery. (R.P .4). 
Aggravating factors included that the minor child was his brother's daughter, for whom Mr. 
Ivie was entrusted to care. (R.P .2). In addition, Mr. Ivie allegedly was using alcohol and marijuana 
with the victim prior to the incident in question. (R.Pp. 2-3). 
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Prior to sentencing, Mr. Ivie obtained a psycho-sexual evaluation from an evaluator in 
Spokane, Washington, Dr. Paul Wert. psycho-sexual evaluation showed that Ivie had a low 
risk to reoffend. (R.P .87). However, prior to sentencing, Mr. Ivie took a lie detector test and filed 
the results with the Court. The test showed deception. (Aug. R.P. 122). The Court found that the lie 
detector test invalidated the findings of Dr. Wert's psycho-sexual evaluation. (Tr.P. 27). 
The Court further found that Mr. Ivie showed no remorse at the sentencing hearing. (Tr.P. 
25.) The Court said, "the remorse you've shown to your victim in the presentence report and today 
at this hearing is absolutely nonexistent. You have shown zero." (Tr.P. 25). 
IV. STANDARD ON REVIEW 
When determining whether a sentence is excessive, the Court must consider all the facts and 
circumstances in the case and determine if the trial Court abused its discretion in the sentence. State 
v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385,143,814 P.2d401, 403 (1991); Statev. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,978 P.2d 
214 (1999). If the sentence is within the statutory limits, the Court reviews the sentence for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 144 P.3d 23 (2006). 
A successful appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment, which are (1) 
Protection of Society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and ( 4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. ( quoting 
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227,231 (1999)). 
State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 319-320, 144 P.3d at 24-25. 
The defendant has the burden of showing that the sentence was unreasonable in light of all of 
the circumstances surrounding the conviction and sentence. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 976 
P.2d 214 (1999). 
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ARGUMENT 
While Mr. Ivie asserts that a sentence of seven years to life in the penitentiary was "'""'''~.,u 
for purposes of appellate review, the Court only considers the fixed term of the sentence as the term 
of confinement. Statev. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,978 P.2d 214 (1999). In the case at bar, Mr. Ivie 
received a fixed term of seven (7) years, followed by an indeterminate term oflife in prison. Mr. Ivie 
argues that a fixed term of seven years, followed by an indeterminate term of life, in light of the 
mitigating facts of the case, was excessive and an abuse of discretion. 
In State v; Knighton, the court considered a denial of a Rule 3 5 when the Defendant received 
three (3) years fixed with a unified term of twenty-five (25) years for a conviction of Lewd Conduct 
and upheld the sentence. Id. In Knighton, the defendant had admitted to having sex with the victim 
35 to 40 times over the course of three years, when the victim was 13 to 16 years old. TheDefendant 
had also been OI}- felony probation two times before. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320, 144 P.3d at 25. 
In State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 657, 791 P.2d 38 (1990), the defendant received two years 
determinate with a 15 year unified sentence after a plea to two counts of Lewd Conduct with a minor. 
Once again, this sentence was upheld. In that case, there were multiple incidents with the victim 
over several years and the victim was the defendant's step daughter. In addition, the Defendant had 
been reported to have had two separate incidents with minors in a gymnastics program where he was 
a coach. Id. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, in State v. Alberts, the Supreme Court overturned a 
sentence of two consecutive terms of fifteen (15) years, with a determinate term of ten (10) years on 
a conviction of two counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child under the age of 16 years. The Court stated 
this sentence was unduly harsh in light of the defendant's showing of remorse, his willingness to 
participate in treatment, and his positive character in general. State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209, 
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1 (1982). 
upheld a sentence thirty with ten years fixed two 
counts of Lewd Conduct. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005). Therein, the Court 
considered the Toohill factors, the fact that there were two separate victims, and also the fact that the 
psycho-sexual evaluation showed the Stover was not a good candidate for treatment because he 
continued to maintain his innocence. Stover, Id. at 929, 971; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 
P.2d 707 (1982). 
A. Mitigating Factors 
The reviewing Court must consider if the sentencing Court's decision was arbitrary, not 
whether the sentence was disproportionate to other sentences based upon the crime. State v. 
Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 739, 890 P.2d 323, 325 (1995). Consideration of the Toohill factors 
indicates that the Court's decision was arbitrary, because the Court did not consider all the mitigating 
factors in Mr. Ivie's particular case. 
In review of the factors set forth in State v. Alb~rts and the Too hill factors, the Court should 
have considered the following mitigating factors. 
1. Mr. Ivie did not repeat his actions over a long period of time and the victim had memory 
problems with regards to the details of the incidents. For this reason, it is difficult to 
determine how many incidents occurred, however, Mr. Ivie confessed to one incident. There 
were two alleged incidents in one weekend. It was alleged by D.I. that Mr. Ivie crept into 
D.I.'s room on two separate nights and started rubbing her private area. (R. P. 20). D.I.'s 
statement was that the first night he came in and started "rubbing her butt and stuff' and then 
she "blacked out" and woke up naked and was sore. (R. P. 20). The second and following 
night, D .I. stated that he was "touching her and stuff'' and then she "just passed out" and 
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she up was "Bleeding down there." (R. P. 20). She further stated that on the 
second night, Reggie was myvagma before she completely passed out 
also stated that she was "tripping on spice" which can make you "hallucinate really bad or 
just pass out" (R.Pp. 19-20). 
2. There is no evidence that Mr. Ivie is a persistent offender. His prior misdemeanor conviction 
was a downward plea of misdemeanor battery from Attempted Strangulation. (R. P. 4). He 
has no prior felony record, and no prior allegations of sexual abuse of any kind. (R.P .4). 
3. Mr. Ivie took full responsibility for his actions early on and before speaking to an attorney. 
(R.P. 3). He also confessed to the officer at the first interview, after having first denied the 
allegation. He admitted to the officer·ofhaving sex one time with D.L This cooperative 
attitude and confession makes him amenable to treatment. Mr. Ivie also stated to the 
Presentence Investigator, "I am truly sorry for this and own up to my huge mistake." (R.P. 
11). 
4. The Court, Judge Mitchell, found that Mr. Ivie exhibited no remorse, however in the 
Presentence Report, Mr. Ivi~ reportedly stated to the presentence investigator, "I am truly 
sorry for this and own up to my huge mistake. I just want to prove myself to everyone by 
getting the help I need to become the best man/ Father possible." (R.P.11). 
5. Mr. Ivie had a psycho-sexual evaluation with a low risk to re-offend, stating Mr. Ivie was 
amendable to treatment. There was no showing of a psychopathic deviance, as was a 
significant issue in State v. Alberts. Dr. Wert' s evaluation stated as follows: "The client 
would appear to be at a low risk of sexual recidivism. Nevertheless, the client is in need of 
sex offender treatment" (R. P. 103). In addition to sex offender treatment, the client may 
need to participate in chemical dependency treatment as he is, by history, cannibus 
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dependent." (R.P. 103). The psycho-sexual evaluation did mention that Mr. Ivie needed 
help in taking responsibility for his actions, "as his explanations keep him from accepting full 
responsibility for his actions." (R.P. 111). The court did not accept the psycho-sexual 
evaluation results due to Mr. Ivie's attorney having submitted a polygraph examination 
which indicated deception. Notwithstanding this issue, Mr. Ivie argues that the psycho-
sexual evaluation illustrated that he was amendable to either probation with in-patient or out-
patient treatment or a retained jurisdiction program. 
6. Mr. Ivie asserts herein that it is not possible to determine whether the lie detector test wholly 
negated the validity of the psycho-sexual evaluation, because the polygraph itself was 
incomplete and invalid. (Aug. R.Pp. 121 148). First, there was no narrative explaining or 
analyzing the outcome or the meaning of the polygraph testing. In addition, certain terms in 
the lie detector test were undecipherable. For example, the testing sets forth a long list of 
questions asked. It does not state what the subject's answers were. There appear to be four 
questions where deception was found, but the test does not indicate how many overall 
questions were asked. (Aug. R.P. 122). One question, R8, is "have you ever tried to touch 
the sex organs of juvenile family member OTD?" It does not explain what OTD means, and 
it does not qualify whether (1) Ivie was an adult at the time, and whether (2) the touching was 
for a sexual reason. This question could include him changing a diaper on his own child, for 
example. The next question, R9, is: "have you withheld any information regarding your 
sexual history from the examiner?" This is also a vague question. The test did not seem to 
ask everything about the subject's sexual history, and was not completely inclusive. Whether 
Ivie were to answer this question yes or no, he likely would have shown deception, unless he 
had a very limited sex life. The next question, R3, asks, "DY remember having sexual 
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intercourse w/any other minor as an adult?" Once again, this question does not show his 
but perhaps we can presume it was no. If so, then age the minor would be 
relevant as well as the age was of the adult. If, for example, Ivie were 18 and the minor was 
17, this may have little to no relevance in this situation. Further, it is unclear from the 
evidence presented whether Mr. Ivie remembers having sexual intercourse with the victim it1 
this case, so the question may be setting forth an untrue antecedent phrase. Question four, 
R5, is, "HY had any other form of sexual contact with a minor?" Once again, the answer is 
not provided. The question does not ask whether Ivie himself was a minor when the sexual 
contact took place. Nor does it specify what kind of sexual contact. It could have been a 
childhood kiss. While Mr. Ivie's attorney at the time did not argue these issues at sentencing, 
neither did the Court comment on the validity of the lie detector test when the Court ruled 
that it undermined the psycho-sexual evaluation. (Aug. R.P. 122). 
7. Mr. Ivie was not ordered to take a lie detector test, but took one at the advice of his attorney. 
Mr. Ivie then submitted the failed lie detector test through counsel. While this issue is one of 
effectiveness of counsel, it should be noted that the willingness of Mr. Ivie to take the test 
when he was not ordered to do so indicates that he was at least believing that he would pass 
it. Moreover, Mr. Ivie's attorney could have kept the test confidential as attorney work 
product, but he chose to provide it to the Court. This again is an issue for Post Conviction 
Relief, but indicates a desire to show candor to the Court to aide in possible treatment, which 
would be a factor in Mr. Ivie's favor pursuant to State v. Stover, cited above. 
8. The age of the victim is important. While the victim was under the age of sixteen years, it is 
a mitigation that the victim was not younger than thirteen years of age. The fact that the 
victim was related to the Defendant does, however, aggravate this factor somewhat. 
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9. The Presentence Investigation Report made erroneous comparisons for se11te:nc1ng guidelines 
Presentence Investigation Report Mr. Ivie 
with other felons with the same conviction with "one prior conviction." (R P. 13, under 
"Sentencing Database Information"). This was probably an erroneous comparison because 
Mr. Ivie did not have a prior conviction for this type of offense. The word "conviction," 
presumably refers to a conviction of a related type. While this is not specified, a conviction 
for example, of Driving Without Privileges, would have little to no significance in sentencing 
compansons. 
10. It is unclear whether the acts were forcible. Concededly it is not relevant to the crime as 
charged whether the other party consented, because a child is too young to consent. 
However, the victim was not able to remember what happened specifically, only that she said 
"no" and then "blacked out" or "passed out." As both parties were impaired, it is unlikely 
that either party have a good memory of what happened on those two occasions. 
11. There was no live testimony from the victim. It is unclear at the time of sentencing what the 
victim's wishes were regarding sentencing. It is not certain whether the victim was 
interviewed by the defense prior to sentencing or if she wrote a victim impact statement. She 
appeared to have been placed into a treatment facility prior to sentencing and her mother had 
attributed her breakdown to this incident, but there was no documentation supporting that 
alleg~tion. 
B. The Toohill Factors 
A sentence may be reversed if a Court appears to be acting on passion and prejudice rather 
than considering all of the Too hill Factors in sentencing. It seems that any of the factors which could 
have been construed in Mr. Ivie's favor on sentencing were construed against him. 
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Protection of Society. Keeping in mind the mitigating factors set forth above, 
leniency on his determinate term and the parole board could have made the decision as to 
when release would have been safe for society. Because the polygraph was apparently 
incomplete, the psycho-sexual evaluation should have been accepted by the Court as 
valid. If the Court was not going to accept the psycho-sexual evaluation, the Court 
should or could have ordered a continuance to determine how the polygraph would affect 
the psycho-sexual evaluation, if at all. 
2. Rehabilitation: As set forth above, Ivie appears to be a good candidate for 
3. 
rehabilitation for all of the reasons stated, and according to the psycho-sexual evaluation. 
If the polygraph is construed in its worst possible light, and Mr. Ivie had previous sexual 
interactions with minors as an adult, it would need to be determined how often, who he 
engaged in these acts with, what the acts were, etc. It is impossible from the evidence in 
front of the Court to determine what would be necessary for rehabilitation without more 
information. But construing the evidence in favor of Mr. Ivie, he is amenable to 
probation. 
Deterrence and Punishment: The factor of deterrence seems to be the only Toohill 
factor the Court considered over the other factors. The Court exhibited anger at Ivie at 
the time of sentencing, saying that he lacked remorse and had not started on any 
treatment prior to sentencing. (Tr. infra). As set forth above, Ivie had several times in 
his Presentence Report and in court reiterated how sorry he was, and he took 
responsibility early on for his actions. At first in his interview with the police officer, 
Mr. Ivie denied it and blamed the victim, but within that same interview, he changed this 
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plead guilty to 
the charge. 
showed remorse in the 
charged and did not a 
Investigation. 
=u•VU~HA~CCU of 
All issues considered, it appears that the Court acted out of passion upon discovering that Mr. 
Ivie had failed a polygraph and upon learning that Mr. Ivie had not started treatment on his own. 
Instead Mr. Ivie was hoping or waiting to be sent on a Retained Jurisdiction program for treatment, 
which fact seemed to have frustrated the Court and caused the Court to act out of passion and 
prejudice. While Mr. Ivie asserts that his defense counsel was unprepared at sentencing, he also 
asserts that the Court was lacking sufficient information to make an informed decision on February 
11, 2016. 
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CONCLUSION: 
foregoing reasons, Ivie requests that the find the sentence this case was 
excessive and that the case be remanded for resentencing on this matter. 
DATED day ofNovernber, 2016. 
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